Is the UAE's Gas Gamble in Syria Actually a 'Triple Win' Orchestrated by Washington?
The situation in Syria is far more complex than it appears on the surface. While headlines focus on the ongoing conflict, a silent power struggle is unfolding beneath, with the United States and its allies making strategic moves that could reshape the entire region. The removal of Russia's key ally, Bashar al-Assad, from power in Syria has been a long-term goal for the West, and recent developments suggest they're intensifying their efforts to secure a strategic advantage in the Middle East. This isn't just about oil and gas; it's about controlling a pivotal link connecting Africa to the south and Europe to the west, thanks to Syria's crucial Mediterranean coastline. (You can find a more in-depth analysis of this in my book on the new global oil market order: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0C2RRNWNY).
The key to keeping Syria aligned with Western interests lies in revitalizing its economy, particularly by focusing on its former primary source of income: gas and oil exports. Western firms are being encouraged to invest and provide on-the-ground assistance, and this is where it gets interesting. These projects conveniently provide a legal justification for stationing 'security' personnel and other assets to protect investments. Think of it as a modern-day Trojan Horse, but with pipelines instead of soldiers.
But here's where it gets controversial... Washington and London are acutely aware of the criticisms leveled against their previous interventions in Iraq and Libya. The longer those operations dragged on, the more they were perceived by locals as neo-colonial occupations. To avoid repeating those mistakes, they're bringing in Arabic states to work alongside Western powers, aiming to create a sense of shared ownership and legitimacy. Enter the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Last week, Dana Gas, a major UAE energy company, signed a preliminary agreement with Syria's state oil company to explore the redevelopment of the country's natural gas fields.
Such fields were, for years, a cornerstone of Syria's economy, rivaled only by oil. Surprisingly, the gas sector sustained less damage than its oil counterpart during the 13-year civil war. Before the conflict, Syria produced approximately 316 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) of dry natural gas, with proven reserves estimated at 8.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Russia certainly recognized this potential, establishing a strong presence in Syria even before the civil war began in 2011. In 2009, Stroytransgaz started developing Syria’s South-Central Gas Area, and by 2011, had boosted the country’s natural gas production by approximately 40%. This allowed Syria’s combined gas and oil exports to generate a quarter of government revenues, making it the eastern Mediterranean’s leading oil and gas producer at the time. After Russia's significant military intervention to support President al-Assad, the two countries signed the 2015 Cooperation Plan. This plan focused on restoring at least 40 energy facilities in Syria, initially prioritizing gas but also including offshore oil fields. It also included rebuilding the power sector, fully reconstructing the Aleppo thermal plant, installing the Deir Ezzor power plant, and expanding the capacity of the Mharda and Tishreen plants, all with the goal of revitalizing Syria's power grid and restoring the main control center to Damascus. In essence, from the West's perspective, a significant amount of groundwork for expansion has already been laid and paid for by Russia.
The same largely applies to Syria's oil sector. The 2015 Russia-Syria Cooperation Plan also included repairing and upgrading the Homs oil refinery (Syria's other refinery was in Banias) to boost its capacity. Phase 1 aimed for a capacity of 140,000 barrels per day (bpd), Phase 2 for 240,000 bpd, and Phase 3 for 360,000 bpd. Russia intended to use this refinery to process Iranian oil coming through Iraq, if required, before shipping it to southern Europe. Before the civil war in 2011, Syria was a major oil producer, yielding about 400,000 bpd of crude oil from proven reserves of 2.5 billion barrels. Before the recovery rate declined due to a lack of enhanced oil recovery techniques, it had been producing nearly 600,000 bpd. Up to the beginning of 2011, Europe imported over US$3 billion of oil annually from Syria, and many European refineries were designed to process the heavy, sour 'Souedie' crude oil, which makes up a large portion of Syria's output, alongside the sweet and lighter 'Syrian Light' grade. Approximately 150,000 bpd combined went to Germany, Italy, and France from Syria's three Mediterranean export terminals: Banias, Tartus, and Latakia. Many international oil companies, including Shell, Petrofac, Gulfsands Petroleum, Total, China National Petroleum Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Corp, Suncor Energy, Tatneft, and Stroytransgaz, operated in Syria's energy sector.
With this infrastructure largely intact, and paid for by Moscow, it’s not surprising that U.S. President Donald Trump lifted Washington's sanctions on Syria's gas and oil sector on May 13th. Great Britain and the European Union had already taken similar steps earlier. Trump made the statement in Riyadh, highlighting the need to involve other Middle Eastern states in Syria’s future. Saudi Arabia has argued that a stable Syria would benefit the Kingdom, enabling it to pursue its own projects in the country and transport its exports, including energy, through Syria to Europe. The same applies to the UAE, which, along with Saudi Arabia, is a key Arabic country that Trump wants to involve as stakeholders in Syria and his broader Middle Eastern strategy. This strategy focuses on building a network of interconnected economic and political relationships across the region, with the U.S. and its allies at the center. This was the original intention of the Abraham Accord deals between Arab states and Israel, as discussed in my latest book on the new global oil market order: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0C2RRNWNY. In this context, the UAE's Dana Gas has a strong track record from the West’s perspective, having played a crucial role in major gas redevelopment projects in Egypt and Iraq, two other key targets for the West's 'new global oil order'. In Iraq, it has been at the forefront of this geopolitical-energy nexus, operating successfully in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Recently, it announced the beginning of gas sales from the region's Khor Mor gas expansion project.
Ultimately, these recent moves in Syria should enable the U.S. and its allies to achieve three critical objectives. First, it places them at the forefront of Syria's economic recovery, allowing them to solidify their influence over the country's future policies. Second, it integrates key Arab countries into the regeneration of a state that is politically, economically, religiously, and geographically significant. This should facilitate the broader implementation of Trump's new consensus across the region through further Abraham Accord-like agreements. And third, it deprives Russia of all these advantages. In the zero-sum game of geopolitics and energy diplomacy, this represents a significant victory for the West.
Now, here's a question for you: Is this a genuine effort to rebuild Syria for the benefit of its people, or is it simply a strategic power play disguised as economic aid? Are the potential benefits worth the risk of further destabilizing an already volatile region? Share your thoughts in the comments below.
By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com
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